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Abstract
This paper examines whether the forced resignation of managers of Dutch football teams leads
to an improvement in the results. We find by analysing 12 years of football in the highest Dutch
league that forced resignations are preceded by declines in team performance and followed by
improvements in performance. However, the improvement in performance after appointing a new
manager does not exceed the seasonal average of both the old and new manager. More
importantly, using a control group, it turns out that when the manager would not have been
forced to resign, performance would have improved more rapidly. We conclude from this that
sacking a manager seems to be neither effective nor efficient in terms of improving team
performance.
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using a small sample drawn from the Continuous Work History Sample (CWHS) as a control group.
 See also Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997) and Heckman, Hohmann, Smith and Khoo (2000). In addition,
2
Heckman and Smith (1999) argue that other variables like employment status are much better in explaining the
pre-program dip. They conclude that unemployment dynamics and not earnings or employment dynamics drive
participation in training programs.
 There have been many extensions and improvements of the methods employed since Ashenfelter’s initial
3
approach, e.g. Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) for an extensive overview.
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1. Introduction
Ashenfelter (1978) was among the first researchers estimating the effects of training
programs on earnings using reference or control groups.  His findings suggested an unpredicted
1
decline in earnings of the different groups of trainees in the months prior to entering the training
program. This phenomenon is now known in the literature as “Ashenfelter’s dip” or the “pre-
program dip” and has been the subject of many empirical studies on the effects of training
programs on labor-market performance. The econometric analysis of the impact of these training
programs on earnings, however, shows little or no lasting effect for participants in the programs.
Recently, Heckman and Smith (1999) have hypothesized that Ashenfelter’s dip may be explained
by a selection bias.  The authors find that methods controlling only for earnings dynamics, like the
2
conventional difference-in-differences estimator, do not adequately capture the underlying
differences between participants and non-participants. In other words, the assumed exogenous
process of assigning agents to a training process is not purely exogenous in the sense that there
is a bias in the data due to self-selection or implicit job search among agents. Hence, people
suffering a large decline in income prior to qualifying for training might be very eager to enroll
in a training program.
3
The econometric methods have been used to estimate the impact of training programs on
earnings and have also been used to estimate and investigate a wide variety of other data and
(social) experiments. One interesting and unique way to use the techniques is to investigate how There are a few studies investigating whether management turnover leads to improved firm performance. See
4
e.g. Denis and Denis (1995), who examine accounting data for large U.S. firms. They find that in those instances
where forced resignations took place, large and significant decreases in operating performance prior to
management changes were observed and increases following the appointment of new management. The study,
however, does not compare these findings with a control group and is therefore not fully able to investigate what
would happen if a sacked manager would have stayed.
 The board has also other alternatives. They can decide to hire new and probably better players or change the
5
financial incentives for both players and the manager. However, buying new players is often very expensive and
changing the payroll system is not so easy because both players and managers have signed contracts which have
to be obeyed. It is therefore that firing the manager and describing him as the “scapegoat” is the most easy way
to establish a “shock effect”.
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severe the performance dip must be before the board of a firm decides to sack a manager.
4
Particularly in the sports business it is well-known that managers are forced to resign when the
results of their teams are below the expected level of performance. The process prior to sacking
a manager can potentially be described as a special case of Ashenfelter’s dip, because the number
of games won or the number of points obtained in the weeks before the manager is laid off is
likely to be low and declining on average. Similar to the fact that people experiencing a large
decline in income might be eager to enroll in training programs, the board, suffering from
disappointing performance by the manager, might be eager to take measures to improve
performance by sacking the manager.
5
During the next few games, after a new manager has replaced the old one, the board
expects the team to perform at a higher level than before the change of managers. This “shock
effect” might save a team from relegation or might enable qualification for lucrative international
tournaments like the Champions League or the UEFA Cup. However, the effectiveness of such
hiring and firing policies seems to be unclear. What is often observed is that the results and
ranking of a team seem to dramatically increase at first but settle after a while at a level which ex
post does not always justify the sacking of the previous manager. This lack of justification can be
seen from the fact that the new manager has not significantly increased the average performance Khanna and Poulsen (1995) investigate such cases for firms, which are in financial trouble. These firms appear
6
to sack managers, who cannot be fully blamed for poor performance.
 The reason why the board would sack a manager even if he is not solely responsible for the disappointing results,
7
is often to bring into effect a “shock effect”. After the sacking the board expects the team to perform better (see
also footnote 5).
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of the previous manager.  Hence, we might hypothesize that boards often replace managers of
6
poorly performing teams even if the managers cannot be fully blamed for poor performance.
7
In this paper we investigate a particular and unique “experiment” by investigating hiring
and firing policies of Dutch football teams in order to observe whether it was justified that
managers were set aside due to poor (short-run) performance. During the period 1988-2000,
there have been 125 turnovers in the highest Dutch football league for a diversity of reasons.
Taking into consideration that there are 18 teams in the Dutch football league this means that each
team had on average 7 managers in this period. One important reason for a manager to leave a
team, either voluntarily or compulsory, is because of disappointing performance. The intriguing
“experiment” in this paper is the following: the “treatment” group consists of managers, who have
been forced to resign because of disappointing results; the “control” group consists of managers,
whose position we define as “sackable”, but who have remained in control. These are situations
in which the performance dynamics are comparable to those after which managers have been
forced to resign due to poor performance. Our findings suggest that sacking a manager after poor
performance does not lead to an improvement in team performance. Using before-after and
difference-in-differences estimators we also find that managers who are allowed to stay in case
of a performance dip seem to lead their teams on average more rapidly to successful performance
again.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 shortly discusses the composition of the data
and elaborates on the specification of the variables and the construction of the control group. In These teams are in alphabetical order Ajax, De Graafschap, FC Groningen, FC Twente, FC Utrecht, FC
8
Volendam, Feyenoord, Fortuna Sittard, MVV, NAC, NEC, PSV, RKC Waalwijk, Roda JC, SC Heerenveen, Sparta,
Vitesse and Willem II.
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Section 3 we outline the econometric approach and present our results. Section 4 concludes.
2. Data
In this section we discuss the composition of the data and the construction of the variables
we use to analyse the sacking of managers. We first briefly describe the Dutch football league
from 1988 to 2000 and the teams included in our analysis. Secondly, we present and discuss the
turnover events and pay particular attention to the official motivation of this turnover provided
by the clubs. Thirdly, we discuss how to measure performance and how to define performance
in such a way that we can apply it to before-after and difference-in-differences estimators. Finally,
we carefully define a control group consisting of those situations, which we define as “sackable”
but in which the manager has been allowed to stay.
2.1. Dutch football league 1988-2000
The highest Dutch football league S the KPN Eredivisie S consists of 18 teams. The
composition of the league changes from year to year because of promotion from and relegation
to the second division. Our data consist of teams which played in the highest league during any
one season between 1988 and 2000.  These teams are listed in Table A1, in the Appendix to this
8
paper, according to their performance for each year in the period 1988-2000. During a season
each team has to play every other team twice (once at home and once away), so that the total
number of games for each team during a season is 34. For each win a team receives 3 points, a
draw gives 1 point, and a loss no points. Hence, the end-of-season team scores lie within a range From 1995 on the 3-1-0 points rule is effective. Before 1995 it was 2-1-0. However, for ease of comparison, we
9
use throughout this paper the 3-1-0 rule for all years. The ranking of teams does not change much when we rely
upon the 3-1-0 rule instead of relying upon the 2-1-0 rule. Only the total amount of points differs. Also, for the
measurement of performance dips the points rule is not important as long as wins yield most points and losses
least.
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of 0 and 102.  Every season the team ending 18  relegates to the second division and the winner
9 th
of the second division is promoted to the KPN Eredivisie. The teams ranking 16  and 17  in the
th th
KPN Eredivisie have to play relegation playoff games.
2.2. Forced and voluntarily resignation
There have been many changes in the management of the 18 teams in Table A1 during the
years under investigation, i.e. 125 turnovers during the 12 seasons we consider, or an average
somewhat above 10 per season. This implies that during the average season, roughly 58 percent
of all teams are faced with manager separation for one reason or another.
The turnover motivations are subdivided into 6 categories; end of contract (42 cases),
poor performance (35), voluntary resignation (25), improved offer of another team (9), disturbed
relationship (8), and a group of other motivations (6). Straightforward calculation yields that 3
out of every 10 resignations involves a forced resignation due to poor performance. Hence, during
an average season, 3 out of 18 teams (17 percent) have sacked their manager as a direct
consequence of disappointing results. This seems to be a rather steep hazard rate for managers,
even when compared to the most competitive business environments out there (e.g. Khanna and
Poulsen, 1995).
In our analysis, we only focus on forced and voluntary resignations during the season.
Since contracts are usually specified to end after a season has finished, this excludes all “end-of-
contract” situations. The remaining other situations (improved offer, disturbed relationship, and
other) occur too infrequently to be of much relevance in the analysis. For that reason our study Koning (2000) takes, besides a short-run analysis, also a longer time horizon. His analysis compares performance
10
in all games (during the season) prior to resignation with performance in all games (during the season) after
resignation. He concludes that performance does not increase due to forced resignation. The board of a football
team is inclined towards a much shorter time horizon, however. Sometimes as short as the immediate effect in the
first game after resignation. In our sample, only 3 out of 10 successors to a sacked manager have won their first
game, 3 more managed a draw. This also suggests that there is no conclusive evidence of an immediate “shock
effect” after sacking a manager. In case of voluntary resignation, 4 out of 10 successors managed to win the first
game and 2 managed a draw.
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focuses on forced and voluntary resignations and is relevant for roughly 50 percent of total
turnover per season and roughly 75 percent of all resignations that are not due to contract expiry
(60 out of 83).
2.3. The measurement of performance
In the league tables in Table A1, team performance is measured by the number of points
obtained during an entire season. During a season, this variable is strictly non-decreasing
(excluding extraordinary penalties by the football association). Measured in total number of points
earned, performance can increase or stagnate, but never decrease. In illustrating the pre-sack dip,
we prefer a performance measure that can decrease when performance stagnates. In addition, the
“shock effect” implies that we are looking at a period of time shorter than a full season of football,
or accumulation of results to date.  An alternative would be to measure performance as points
10
earned per game, so that performance can vary from 0 to 1 and 3 (or low, medium, high or any
alternative re-scaling of the payoff to losing, drawing and winning, respectively). The important
drawback of this alternative is that performance may get too volatile to be altogether informative
and may therefore complicate statistical analysis considerably. Here we opt for some sort of
compromise between these two extremist alternatives and define a performance measure that is
related to points per game obtained on average during the last 4 games. This way, we obtain a
performance measure that can go down considerably in case of a series of bad games, but at the Consider for illustration the case of Ajax, who have the largest annual budget of all Dutch teams. During the
11
four most recent seasons, Ajax won the league once, but finished behind the top three in the other three seasons
(see e.g. Table A1). This strongly suggests that the short-term link between annual budgets and performance is
far less than perfect.
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same time is not too sensitive to an occasional loss (win) in a series of wins (losses).
In order to evaluate whether performance is high or low, we want to make a comparison
with some “ordinary” performance level for the relevant team in a particular season. Of course,
measuring the ordinary level of performance – which should vary with the composition of the
squad, the annual budget, the quality of the manager, player form, etcetera – is a complicated
methodological issue. We consider three options here. The most direct measure we can think of
proceeds along two steps. First, historical information is used to derive the average number of
points obtained per game for teams that finish first, second, third, and so on in the league. Pre-
season information on the annual budgets for all teams is then used to compute an expected
ranking for the end of the current season and the historical average numbers of points per game
are then attached to each ranking. This defines the expected level of this season’s performance
for a particular team based on its budget. We do not implement this normal performance measure
for two reasons. The first reason is that we only have information on the annual budgets for the
two most recent seasons and partially for one additional season. Secondly, budgets are likely to
have an important impact on performance over the long term, but the role of the annual budget
on a season-by-season basis seems to be unclear.
11
Alternatively, we may use some form of adaptive expectations to generate expectations
for the current season, i.e. insert the average number of points per game obtained in the previous
season (or an average over a particular number of previous seasons) as the expected performance
level for the current season. A clear objection to this approach is the bias that may result from
buying and selling players in between seasons, changes in the budget over time, and so on. Measuring the average performance of the old and the new manager separately may generate small sample biases
12
in those instances where resignation is near the start or end of the season.
 Performance measured by points per game during the last 3 and 5 games does not qualitatively alter the results.
13
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The measure of ordinary performance we employ for the remainder of this analysis is the
average number of points obtained per game during the current season. In this manner we
circumvent the issues of (large) changes in the squad’s composition and adjustment of annual
budgets in between seasons. However, two potentially important problems have to be born in
mind. First, “ordinary” performance is determined in-sample and in the case of a manager
resignation, we measure this performance as the average performance of the leaving manager and
his successor.  Should the resigning manager have performed relatively badly, then obviously his
12
successor has an easy job in “beating” this performance level, so that we may overstate the effect
of his resignation. Fortunately, the comparison of performance levels between the resigning
manager and his successor seems to be still valid. Secondly, in defining the ordinary performance
level as the average for the current season, we implicitly impose the requirement that spells of
performance below this average are at some point during the season compensated by off-setting
spells of above-average performance. However, neither the timing of the return to ordinary
performance nor the spell of above-average performance is a priori restricted to follow directly
after the resignation of the manager. For these reasons we consider this measure to be a rather
accurate proxy for the performance level at which the potential problems should not interfere with
our main interest: the direct performance effect of manager resignation.
As a final step, we compute the relative performance of a particular team at a particular
point in time as the four-game point average divided by the seasonal average of points per game.
13
Performance defined in this way provides insight into the performance of a team relative to season
average, or “ordinary” performance. Whenever performance exceeds unity, the team performs at We are aware of another potential problem that this definition may generate: a team may be faced with a bad
14
season. In such cases we are a bit too quick to conclude that a team performs better than expected when in fact
what happens is that the team performs persistently less than expected. We do not believe, however, that this
potential caveat affects our main results significantly.  
 The reason for this is that we take a four-game average as performance level. This means that games 1, 2, 3 and
15
4 must be played before we can construct our first performance level. Performance can then decline during the four
games 5, 6, 7 and 8 after which the manager may be sacked. In this instance we have exactly sufficient information
prior to the resignation. Similarly, at the end of the season, when the manager is sacked in between games 30 and
31, we have games 31, 32, 33 and 34 to examine the potential performance increase after resignation.
-9-
a higher level than the ordinary level and vice versa. An advantage of this performance measure
is that it has the same interpretation for all teams.
14
2.4. Construction of the control group
Having defined a measure of performance, we may investigate performance dynamics
around manager resignations. In order to evaluate the sense of a resignation, we want to
determine its effectiveness and efficiency separately. Effectiveness of a resignation requires that
the team emerges better from a resignation in terms of performance. Efficiency of a resignation
requires that the effect of the resignation could not have been achieved at lower cost by taking
other measures rather than sacking the manager.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of a resignation, we compare performance both prior
to and after resignation. We select a period of 4 games prior to resignation and 4 games after
resignation as our period of analysis. On the one hand, this seems to be a sufficiently long period
to allow for the full effect on our performance measure of a bad streak of 4 games. On the other
hand, it costs us least in terms of lost observations (for resignations close to the start or end of
the season). The selected period of analysis requires resignations to take place after game 8 and
before game 31 in order to be included in our analysis.  What we require in terms of effectiveness
15
is that performance measured 1, 2, 3 or 4 games after resignation exceeds performance 1, 2, 3 or
4 games prior to resignation.-10-
Regarding the assessment of efficiency of resignation, we want to compare it to the most
straightforward alterative: do not sack the manager. Obviously, the hypothetical performance of
the sacked manager after his forced resignation cannot be observed by definition. Performance
after forced resignation when the manager is not sacked is a latent variable, which can only be
obtained from a natural experiment. What we can do instead, is construct an indirect measure of
these hypothetical performance levels, i.e. we want to know what happens to teams not sacking
their managers even though their performance during a four-game period mimics that of a forced
resignation. We construct this control group according to the following steps.
First, we present performance levels prior to resignation in Figure 1. We read from the
graph that performance prior to forced resignation drops from 95 percent to 65 percent of the
season average. For voluntary resignations performance starts out higher (at season average) and
drops to close to 90 percent. For the construction of our control group, we only use the
performance information of forced resignations. The major motivation to do so is that this type
of resignation is closest related to team performance (the official reading being “sacked due to
poor performance”). For voluntary resignations other factors may play a role that do not show
up in performance.
INSERT FIGURE 1 OVER HERE
Secondly, in terms of performance we observe three distinct features prior to forced
resignation: performance is not extremely good to begin with; it declines sharply over a four-game
period; and, it ends up at a low level. We apply these criteria to all teams and all seasons to
identify those instances in which a four-game period exhibits these three characteristics. In
particular, we require an initial performance level of at most 10 percent above normal; a decline We require a distance of 4 games or more in between any two dips – persistent performance dips would otherwise
16
be weighted too heavily as in some dips the 3 criteria are met for 2 or more periods in a row – and in between any
dip and resignation (so that we effectively exclude resignations from the control group). 
-11-
in performance during the following 4 games of 25 percentage points or more; and, a final
performance level of 65 percent of normal or worse after 4 games. We make sure that these
performance dips (or “sackable” situations) do not overlap with each other or with forced or
voluntary resignation. Hence dips and resignations are mutually exclusive in our analysis.
16
We have a control group of 103 performance dips where the manager is not sacked. In
all these cases, performance dynamics during the 4 games that result in their classification as a dip,
validates a forced resignation of the manager when compared to the forced resignation instances.
The performance of these teams in the 4 games after they have “entered” the dip may therefore
substitute for the unobservable performance of the resigned manager in the 4 games after his
resignation when he would not have been sacked.
INSERT TABLE 1 OVER HERE
Table 1 summarizes manager resignations and performance dips per team we will use for
further analysis. Note that the table does not register all forced and voluntary resignations. As
mentioned above, we include only resignations dated after the 8  game and before the 31  game
th st
(cf. footnote 15). An important observation resulting from Table 1 and strengthening the
representativeness of our control group is that forced resignations, voluntary resignations and
performance dips seem to be uniformly distributed across clubs. The relevant P (17) statistic of
2
the test on uniformity at the bottom of the table never exceeds the 10 percent critical value (24.8) We might conjecture that “big” teams are harsher towards managers when their higher expectations are not met
17
by team performance, while at the same time performance of “small” teams is more volatile. In this scenario, the
resignations are concentrated among the big teams and performance dips among small team, an observation that
obviously would cast doubt upon the representativeness of our control group.
 Note that time t is non-existent because managers are sacked in between games, not during a game.
18
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and for the season-average numbers does not even exceed the 25 percent critical level (20.5).
17
3. Before-after analysis and the difference-in-differences estimator
In this section, we examine the mean performance levels of teams around the date of
resignation, and consider their implications for before-after estimators of the impact on team
performance.
3.1. All resignations
The first three columns in Panel A of Table 2 report the mean scores of sacked managers,
managers who have voluntarily left a team and the scores of managers who found themselves in
a performance dip but were allowed to stay at the club (the control group). Time is measured in
match days prior to and after resignation.  From Panel A we observe that performance in case
18
of forced resignation declines from roughly the seasonal average to approximately 65 percent
thereof during the 4 games leading to forced resignation. The dip reaches its lowest point (is most
severe) after the game prior to resignation. In case of a voluntary quit this decline is less
pronounced: performance drops from seasonal average to about 90 percent. Immediately after the
manager has involuntarily left the team the performance moves back to slightly below the seasonal
average at t+4, while a voluntary resignation is followed by a performance increase to
approximately 15 percent above season average. Our control group exhibits a comparable dip in
performance around time t; the subsequent upswing, however, is markedly stronger.-13-
INSERT TABLE 2 OVER HERE
In column (4) we first compare performance levels around forced and voluntary
resignations. We observe that the performance dip (t!4 to t!1) in case of forced resignation
seems to be somewhat more pronounced but at the same time this difference is not significantly
different at error levels higher than 10 percent. In both instances after the resignation (t+1 to t+4)
performance improves. However, teams sacking a manager seem to keep performing at a lower
level than teams who see their manager leave voluntarily. The difference in performance during
t+1 to t+4 remains nearly constant and significantly positive. This indicates that although in both
instances performance increases after t!1, teams sacking a manager still perform at lower levels
relative to teams facing voluntarily resignation. Comparing forced resignations with the control
group in column (5) of Table 2, we observe that the performance dip of the control group seems
to be more severe. Recovery on the other hand seems to occur much more rapidly. Finally, in
column (6) we compare the managers leaving voluntarily with the control group. The most
important insight is that the observations around the dip are statistically different from each other
while at both ends of the two samples performance is comparable (i.e. the dip is more
pronounced, but the initial (t!5) and final (t+4) performance levels are comparable).
More comprehensive is a comparison of the difference between the pre-sack four-game
point average of teams and their hypothetical post-sack recovery, had the manager not been
sacked. Following Heckman and Smith (1999), let Y  denote the four-game point average c,u
without sacking the manager in the period after time t (u > t) and Y  denote the four-game point c,-u
average without sacking the manager in the period before time t. Similarly, let Y  denote the s,u
point average with sacking the manager in the period after time t and Y  the point average with s,-u
sacking the manager in the period before time t. Let D = 1 for teams who find themselves in aE(Ys,u&Ys,&u*R’1,D’1) & E(Yc,u&Yc,&u*R’0,D’1).
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performance dip and D = 0 otherwise, and let R = 1 for teams who sack the manager and R = 0
for teams who do not sack their manager. The experimental impact is then defined as
This is the difference-in-differences in the four-game point average between the “treatment”
(sacked managers) and “controls” (managers who are allowed to continue) in period u after the
performance dip compared to period !u before the dip. 
In Panel B and C of Table 2 we construct the before (Y  and Y ) and after (Y  and Y ) s,-u c,-u s,u c,u
estimators separately for the two treatment groups (forced and voluntary resignation) and the
control group. From the first three columns it becomes clear that performance before forced
resignation is deteriorating significantly, while the performance trend towards a voluntarily quit
is also negative but not statistically different from zero. The performance level in the control
group is subject to a significant decline prior to the hypothetical sacking. After forced resignation
we observe a slight improvement in performance after a while (in particular, only After-4 is
significant). Hence, we do not observe an immediate effect of sacking a manager; similar
conclusions apply to voluntary quits (significant only for After-2 and After-4). The control group,
however, is improving both rapidly and significantly (all After estimates are always positive and
significant).
Next, in column (5) of Panel B we compare forced resignations with the controls.  We
observe that prior to the dip the behaviour of the two groups is statistically similar, but after the
dip the performance level of the controls is significantly higher. This suggests that sacking a
manager might not be the remedy to solve a crisis. Comparing the controls with voluntarily
leaving managers (column (6)) we obtain that the performance prior to leaving is not described-15-
by a dip to the same extent as for the control group. After the manager has left, the controls
perform much better. 
Finally, in Panel C we have constructed the before-after estimates (Y  ! Y  and Y  ! s,u s,-u c,u
Y ) and the difference-in-differences estimator ((Y  ! Y ) ! (Y  ! Y )). What is interesting c,-u s,u s,-u c,u c,-u
here is that the before-after estimates are only significant for the controls. The before-after
estimates are of central importance in evaluating the effectiveness of resignation, because if they
turn out insignificant the performance increase is merely the opposite of the dip prior to
resignation, i.e. the resignation is not effectively increasing performance. In case of resignation
performance indeed turns out to be insignificantly different before and after resignation. This
result is consistent with the view that resignations (regardless of being forced or voluntary) are
not effective in terms of increasing performance. Of additional interest is the difference-in-
differences estimator in column (5). Here we observe that the control group has recovered
relatively more rapidly from the performance dip. All coefficients are negative here and seem to
indicate (at the 90 percent level of confidence immediately after the resignation and at the 95
percent level of confidence after 3 games) that sacking a manager does not lead to performance
improvements compared to allowing him to stay. This finding implies that resignations are also
inefficient in boosting performance.
3.2. Successful and unsuccessful resignations
The results presented above suggest that resignations are both inefficient and ineffective
as performance improving measures. Though this result holds on average, there are still instances
where, ex post, resignation turned out to be very successful. Therefore, we may still be able to
discriminate a priori between those resignations that ex post turned out to be successful. In this
section we try to gain additional insight into this matter by subdividing the sample into successful-16-
and unsuccessful resignations and dips. Successful resignations and dips are defined as those out
of which the club emerged better in terms of the before-after-4 measure, i.e. those instances for
which performance 4 games after the resignation exceeded that of 4 games prior to resignation.
Unsuccessful resignations and dips are defined as those for which the before-after-4 estimator is
zero or negative.
Panel A in Table 3 presents information on the before-after estimates for the successful
forced and unforced resignations and dips. From the first two columns we read that for the 4, 3,
2 and 1 game-periods alike the before-after estimator is positive and in all instances statistically
discernibly so at 90 percent level of confidence or better. From the third column we observe that
a similar pattern emerges for the control group. The last two columns show that neither successful
forced nor successful voluntary resignations outperform the successful controls. This suggests that
sacking ! when sacking the manager is ex post successful ! results in the same expected
performance improvement as when the manager would have been allowed to stay. Hence even
ex post successful forced resignations seem to be inefficient.
INSERT TABLE 3 OVER HERE
Panel B of Table 3 reports (i) the number of games the manager was employed by the club
when he resigned or experienced a dip, (ii) the total number of dips experienced while employed
at this club and (iii) the number of dips experienced during the season in which he is released or
faces his most recent dip. The last three columns show that the managers in the control group
have been with the club for a significantly longer period of time and they experienced slightly
more dips both during their entire careers with the respective club and during the season in which
the dip occurs. Hence, although they appear to be slightly poorer managers in terms of dips Voluntary resignations include many spells of interim management. This explains both their very short average
19
employment spells and the low number of average total (and current season) dips. Note that in Table 3 the average
employment spell of voluntarily resigning managers is also shortest of all three groups.
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experienced, they seem to recover from any given dip just as rapidly as would result from a forced
or voluntary resignation.
Table 4 presents the same information for unsuccessful resignations and performance dips.
Panel A demonstrates that the before-after estimates are significantly negative in most cases for
forced resignations and the controls, but insignificant (although negative on average) for voluntary
resignations (columns 1-3). Column (5) suggests that unsuccessful forced resignations are
structurally more unsuccessful than the controls, while the last column shows that the before-after
estimates of voluntary resignations and the controls are not statistically different from each other.
Hence unsuccessful forced resignations are inefficient as well and compared to the controls they
actually appear counter-productive.
INSERT TABLE 4 OVER HERE
Regarding the manager specific characteristics in Panel B, we focus only on the
comparison between forced resignations and the controls (column (5)).  Here we see that
19
unsuccessful forced resignations (compared to controls) involve managers who have been with
the team somewhat longer, experienced an equal average number of dips during the current
season, but during their careers they experienced on average one additional dip. Hence, managers
with poorer track records, those we might think are rightfully forced into resignations, actually
constitute the resignations that are ex post not only unsuccessful, but even more unsuccessful than
the controls. Note that we cannot statistically discriminate ex ante between managers whose
forced resignation is ex post successful and those for which it is unsuccessful in terms of manager-18-
specific characteristics (compare the first columns of Panels B in Tables 3 and 4). Also note that
the share of successful forced resignations in total forced resignations is about 50 percent while
the same share for the controls is roughly 66 percent
Our overall reading of the results is the following. When forced resignations are
successful, this success does not seem to exceed the success that might have been achieved by not
sacking the manager. When forced resignations are unsuccessful, the failure exceeds that which
would have to be incurred when the manager would not have been sacked. Since we cannot
discriminate between managers whose forced resignation would be a success and those for which
it would be a failure, sacking has equal probabilities of success and failure ex ante. The option not
to sack during a dip seems to produce a 2/3 probability of success and 1/3 probability of failure.
Therefore, in terms of expectations, the expected pay-off of forced resignation seems to be less
than that of not forcing the manager into resignation, due to both a higher probability of failure
and a larger degree of failure for the forced resignation situation.
4. Concluding Remarks
We have investigated performance dynamics around particularly forced resignations during
twelve seasons in Dutch football. We document that performance improves following both forced
and voluntary resignations. However, after close inspection, we find that this effect is likely not
to be caused by the resignation as our control group exhibits even stronger performance increases.
These results are consistent with those obtained in the econometric evaluation of social programs
and labour market training programs (e.g. Heckman and Smith, 1999). In the training literature
this is often attributed to self-selection by participants even if experiments are seemingly
randomized. While it is less conceivable that a manager is inclined to self-select into a forced
resignation, our results suggest that the expected effect on average of a forced resignation is a Koning (2000) argues that program effects and a series of away games may also substantially influence the
20
performance of a team.
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return to the pre-sack performance level.  This effect (and more, in fact) is also obtained by not
20
forcing the manager into resignation. Our results shed doubt on the effectiveness and efficiency
of forced resignations of which the official reading is “sacked due to poor performance”.
Our findings sum up as follows. First, performance deteriorates sharply prior to the
resignation and improves rapidly after forced resignation. There is no discernibly positive before-
after impact of both forced and voluntary resignations (but there is for the controls). This implies
that resignations are ineffective in improving performance. Secondly, difference-in-differences
estimates show that the before-after estimates for the control group are statistically discernible
and larger than those for forced resignations, but differ little from voluntary resignations. Hence,
the data show that forced resignations are inefficient as well as ineffective in improving
performance. Thirdly, in cases where forced resignation is ex post effective, it is still inefficient
and the same conclusion holds for forced resignations that are ex post ineffective.  In particular,
where the effect of an ex post successful resignation does not outweigh that of the controls, the
failure of ex post ineffective forced resignation does outweigh that of the controls. Fourthly, we
cannot discriminate a priori between managers whose forced resignation is ex post successful and
unsuccessful. These last two findings suggest that in terms of expected valuation, teams do best
not to force their managers into resignation in a performance dip.
Overall it turns out that would the manager have been allowed to stay, he would have
done slightly better than his successor in improving performance. This is an important result for
two additional reasons. First, it seems to become clear there is no such thing as a “shock effect”.
This underlines that the sacking of a manager seems to be a costly way of signalling there might
be something wrong with the team. In addition, it underscores that the manager is often assigned-20-
as the scapegoat when performance is temporarily poor (e.g. Khanna and Poulsen, 1995, for
business enterprises). Secondly, in large companies CEO’s are often blamed for poor
performance. In the literature there is little evidence that sacking the CEO leads to improved
performance. Hence, an unresolved question is why managers are sacked if it does not materially
improve performance. For football our results suggest that it is not his experience (stay at the
team) or the ability to deal with performance dips.-21-
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Number of forced and unforced resignations and performance dips per team: 1988-2000
Club # Seasons Forced Voluntary Performance
observed resignation resignation dip
Ajax 12 2 0 8
De Graafschap 6 0 0 5
FC Groningen 10 4 0 3
FC Twente 12 0 2 8
FC Utrecht 12 3 3 8
FC Volendam 9 0 2 3
Feyenoord 12 4 3 5
Fortuna Sittard 10 1 0 7
MVV 10 0 0 4
NAC 6 1 0 1
NEC 7 2 1 7
PSV 12 0 2 5
RKC Waalwijk 12 3 0 10
Roda JC 12 2 2 4
SC Heerenveen 8 0 0 6
Sparta 12 2 1 4
Vitesse 11 2 2 5
Willem II 12 1 0 10
Total 27 18 103
P (17) season 1.96 1.88 1.71
2
averages
P (17) totals 2167 2200 1811
2
Note: the resignations and performance dips are mutually exclusive in the sense that the figures
in the columns concerning forced resignations and voluntary resignations are not included in the
column on performance dips. Numbers count the total of observation for the team during the
sample period. “P (17) totals” tests for uniformity of totals across teams. “P (17) season avg.”
2 2
tests for uniformity of dips and resignations per season across teams.-24-
Table 2
Team performance around forced and voluntary resignations and performance dips
1
PANEL A: PERFORMANCE LEVELS2
Forced Voluntary Control FR ! VR FR ! CG VR ! CG
Resignation Resignation Group
(FR) (VR) (CG)
Observations 27 18 103
t!5 0.948 1.005 0.921 !0.057 0.027 0.084
t!4 0.871 0.961 0.827 !0.090 0.044 0.134
t!3 0.843 0.841 0.721 0.002 0.122 0.120
t!2 0.774 0.942 0.615 !0.168 0.159 0.327
t!1 0.650 0.881 0.409 !0.231 0.241 0.472
t+1 0.664 0.984 0.585 !0.320 0.079 0.399
t+2 0.704 1.094 0.788 !0.390 !0.084 0.306
t+3 0.728 1.069 0.958 !0.341 !0.230 0.111
t+4 0.903 1.176 1.158 !0.273 !0.255 0.018
***
(0.108) (0.087) (0.014) (0.139) (0.109) (0.088)
***
(0.102) (0.108) (0.030) (0.149) (0.106) (0.112)
***
(0.100) (0.115) (0.030) (0.152) (0.104) (0.119)
***
(0.079) (0.104) (0.031) (0.131) (0.085) (0.109)
***
(0.071) (0.097) (0.019) (0.120) (0.073) (0.099)
***
(0.069) (0.117) (0.034) (0.136) (0.077) (0.122)
***
(0.084) (0.106) (0.041) (0.135) (0.093) (0.114)
***
(0.085) (0.106) (0.045) (0.136) (0.096) (0.115)
***
































PANEL B: THE PRE-RESIGNATION DIP QUANTIFIED3
Forced Voluntary Control FR ! VR FR ! CG VR ! CG
Resignation Resignation Group
(FR) (VR) (CG)
Before-1 !0.124 !0.061 !0.206 !0.063 0.082 0.145
Before-2 !0.193 0.040 !0.303 !0.233 0.110 0.343
Before-3 !0.221 !0.080 !0.418 !0.141 0.197 0.338
Before-4 !0.298 !0.124 !0.512 !0.174 0.214 0.388
After-1 0.014 0.103 0.176 !0.089 !0.162 !0.073
After-2 0.054 0.213 0.378 !0.159 !0.324 !0.165
After-3 0.078 0.188 0.549 !0.110 !0.471 !0.361
After-4 0.253 0.295 0.749 !0.042 !0.496 !0.454
*
(0.072) (0.074) (0.028) (0.103) (0.077) (0.079)
*
(0.097) (0.122) (0.030) (0.156) (0.102) (0.126)
**
(0.098) (0.119) (0.029) (0.154) (0.102) (0.122)
**
(0.117) (0.124) (0.018) (0.170) (0.118) (0.125)
(0.081) (0.067) (0.028) (0.105) (0.086) (0.073)
(0.104) (0.093) (0.040) (0.140) (0.111) (0.101)
(0.109) (0.131) (0.048) (0.170) (0.119) (0.140)
*























PANEL C: BEFORE-AFTER ANALYSIS AND THE DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATOR4
Forced Voluntary Control FR ! VR FR ! CG VR ! CG
Resignation Resignation Group
(FR) (VR) (CG)
Before-After-1 0.014 0.103 0.176 !0.089 !0.162 !0.073
Before-After-2 !0.070 0.152 0.173 !0.222 !0.243 !0.021
Before-After-3 !0.115 0.228 0.237 !0.343 !0.352 !0.009
Before-After-4 0.032 0.215 0.331 !0.183 !0.299 !0.116
(0.081) (0.067) (0.028) (0.105) (0.086) (0.073)
(0.126) (0.134) (0.046) (0.184) (0.134) (0.142)
(0.145) (0.158) (0.056) (0.214) (0.155) (0.168)









Standard errors in parentheses.
1
Performance levels are measured relative to season average. Time is measured in games relative to
2
the resignation date, i.e. t!1 refers to the last game under the resigning manager. Since managers
are not sacked during a game, there is never an observation t.
Before-X refers to the difference in performance levels (Panel A) between t!X!1 and t!1. After-X
3
refers to the difference in performance levels between t+X and t!1. The apparent asymmetry stems
from the time-scale used: the performance level at t!1 is the same as that at time t, since no games
are played in between.
Before-After-X refers to the difference in performance levels between t+X and t!X.
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Table 3
Team performance and manager characteristics 
around successful forced and voluntary resignations and performance dips
1
PANEL A: BEFORE-AFTER ANALYSIS AND THE DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATOR2
Forced Voluntary Control FR ! VR FR ! CG VR ! CG
Resignation Resignation Group
(FR) (VR) (CG)
Observations 13 11 68
Before-After-1 0.207 0.176 0.259 0.030 !0.052 !0.082
Before-After-2 0.325 0.342 0.330 !0.017 !0.005 0.012
Before-After-3 0.352 0.497 0.501 !0.145 !0.149 !0.004
Before-After-4 0.613 0.619 0.658 !0.006 !0.044 !0.039
*
(0.115) (0.064) (0.032) (0.132) (0.120) (0.072)
**
(0.137) (0.141) (0.056) (0.197) (0.148) (0.152)
**
(0.153) (0.155) (0.058) (0.218) (0.163) (0.165)
***









PANEL B: MANAGER SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS
Forced Voluntary Control FR ! VR FR ! CG VR ! CG
Resignation Resignation Group
(FR) (VR) (CG)
Time employed 32.231 20.091 54.441 12.140 !22.210 !34.350
3
Total number of  2.077 1.727 2.441 0.350 !0.364 !0.714
dips (0.415) (0.727) (0.211) (0.838) (0.466) (0.757)
4
Dips in current 1.077 1.000 1.294 0.077 !0.217 !0.294
season (0.211) (0.270) (0.063) (0.342) (0.220) (0.277)
***










Successful resignations and performance dips are those out of which the club emerged better in
1
terms of Before-After-4, i.e. those situations for which this measure exceeds 0. Standard errors in
parentheses.
Before-After-X refers to the difference in performance levels between t+X and t!X.
2
The period the resigning coach was employed by a club, measured in game days.
3
Total number of performance dips while employed by the club.
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Table 4
Team performance and manager characteristics 
around unsuccessful forced and voluntary resignations and performance dips
1
PANEL A: BEFORE-AFTER ANALYSIS AND THE DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATOR2
Forced Voluntary Control FR ! VR FR ! CG VR ! CG
Resignation Resignation Group
(FR) (VR) (CG)
Observations 14 7 35
Before-After-1 !0.165 !0.011 0.014 !0.154 !0.180 !0.026
Before-After-2 !0.436 !0.146 !0.135 !0.290 !0.301 !0.011
Before-After-3 !0.549 !0.195 !0.248 !0.354 !0.301 0.054
Before-After-4 !0.507 !0.421 !0.303 !0.087 !0.204 !0.117
(0.094) (0.137) (0.044) (0.166) (0.104) (0.144)
**
(0.154) (0.231) (0.052) (0.277) (0.162) (0.237)
***
(0.176) (0.266) (0.063) (0.319) (0.187) (0.273)
***








PANEL B: MANAGER SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS
Forced Voluntary Control FR ! VR FR ! CG VR ! CG
Resignation Resignation Group
(FR) (VR) (CG)
Time employed 47.929 6.714 37.257 41.214 10.671 !30.543
3
Total number of  2.857 0.143 1.857 2.714 1.000 !1.714
dips (0.467) (0.143) (0.184) (0.488) (0.502) (0.233)
4
Dips in current 1.071 0.143 1.143 0.929 !0.071 !1.000
season (0.127) (0.143) (0.060) (0.191) (0.140) (0.155)
***












Successful resignations and performance dips are those out of which the club emerged better in
1
terms of Before-After-4, i.e. those situations for which this measure exceeds 0. Standard errors in
parentheses.
Before-After-X refers to the difference in performance levels between t+X and t!X.
2
The period the resigning coach was employed by a club, measured in game days.
3




Performance Tables of 18 squads in the KPN Eredivisie 1988-2000
1988/1989 1989/1990 1990/1991 1991/1992
Team Points Team Points Team Points Team Points
PSV 77 Ajax 68 PSV 76 PSV 83
Ajax 72 PSV 68 Ajax 75 Ajax 80
Feyenoord 55 FC Twente 58 FC Groningen 64 Feyenoord 69
FC Twente 51 Vitesse 56 FC Utrecht 58 Vitesse 55
Roda JC 51 Roda JC 55 FC Twente 49 FC Groningen 53
FC Groningen 50 FC Volendam 54 Vitesse 48 FC Twente 48
FC Volendam 46 Fortuna Sittard 50 RKC Waalwijk 46 Roda JC 47
Fortuna Sittard 45 RKC Waalwijk 50 Roda JC 43 MVV 46
RKC Waalwijk 42 FC Groningen 45 Willem II 43 Sparta 46
FC Utrecht 40 Sparta 43 FC Volendam 42 RKC Waalwijk 44
MVV 39 Feyenoord 40 Feyenoord 40 FC Utrecht 42
Sparta 39 FC Utrecht 35 Fortuna Sittard 39 Willem II 42
Willem II 35 MVV 34 MVV 36 FC Volendam 38
De Graafschap Willem II 34 Sparta 36 Fortuna Sittard 32
*
NAC NEC 31 SC Heerenveen 33 De Graafschap 27
*
NEC De Graafschap NEC 29 NAC
*
SC Heerenveen NAC De Graafschap NEC
*










 Indicates that we do not have data on these teams for a particular year because these squads were not playing at the highest level in a particular year.
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Performance Tables of 18 squads in the KPN Eredivisie 1988-2000 (continued)
1992/1993 1993/1994 1994/1995 1995/1996
Team Points Team Points Team Points Team Points
Feyenoord 75 Ajax 80 Ajax 88 Ajax 83
PSV 73 Feyenoord 70 Roda JC 76 PSV 77
Ajax 69 PSV 61 PSV 67 Feyenoord 63
Vitesse 62 Vitesse 57 Feyenoord 62 Roda JC 57
FC Twente 59 FC Twente 54 FC Twente 59 SC Heerenveen 53
MVV 52 Roda JC 53 Vitesse 54 Sparta 53
FC Volendam 49 NAC 52 Willem II 47 Vitesse 52
FC Utrecht 47 Willem II 52 RKC Waalwijk 44 NAC 49
RKC Waalwijk 45 Sparta 44 SC Heerenveen 42 FC Groningen 48
Willem II 44 FC Volendam 43 NAC 40 FC Twente 44
Roda JC 40 MVV 43 FC Volendam 37 RKC Waalwijk 39
FC Groningen 38 SC Heerenveen 37 FC Utrecht 35 Willem II 31
Sparta 35 FC Groningen 35 FC Groningen 34 Fortuna Sittard 29
Fortuna Sittard 28 FC Utrecht 35 NEC 34 De Graafschap 28
De Graafschap RKC Waalwijk 33 Sparta 34 FC Utrecht 27
*
NAC De Graafschap MVV 30 FC Volendam 25
*
NEC Fortuna Sittard De Graafschap NEC
*









 Indicates that we do not have data on these teams for a particular year because these squads were not playing at the highest level in a particular year.
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Performance Tables of 18 squads in the KPN Eredivisie 1988-2000 (continued)
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Team Points Team Points Team Points Team Points
PSV 77 Ajax 89 Feyenoord 80 PSV 84
Feyenoord 73 PSV 72 Willem II 65 SC Heerenveen 68
FC Twente 65 Vitesse 70 PSV 61 Feyenoord 64
Ajax 61 Feyenoord 61 Vitesse 61 Vitesse 63
Roda JC 55 SC Heerenveen 55 Roda JC 60 Ajax 61
Vitesse 55 Willem II 55 Ajax 57 FC Twente 60
SC Heerenveen 50 Fortuna Sittard 48 SC Heerenveen 54 Roda JC 55
De Graafschap 45 NEC 44 FC Twente 52 Willem II 48
NAC 40 FC Twente 43 Fortuna Sittard 44 FC Utrecht 46
FC Groningen 39 FC Utrecht 43 NEC 39 RKC Waalwijk 42
Fortuna Sittard 39 De Graafschap 42 FC Utrecht 38 Fortuna Sittard 38
FC Utrecht 38 NAC 42 De Graafschap 36 Sparta 37
FC Volendam 38 Sparta 41 MVV 32 De Graafschap 33
Sparta 38 Roda JC 38 RKC Waalwijk 27 NEC 27
Willem II 35 MVV 32 Sparta 26 MVV 25
RKC Waalwijk 34 FC Groningen 31 NAC 23 FC Groningen
NEC 32 RKC Waalwijk 31 FC Groningen FC Volendam







 Indicates that we do not have data on these teams for a particular year because these squads were not playing at the highest level in a particular year.
*MERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum series
- 2001-
2001-001 The Changing Nature of Pharmaceutical R&D - Opportunities for Asia?
Jörg C. Mahlich and Thomas Roediger-Schluga
2001-002 The Stringency of Environmental Regulation and the 'Porter Hypothesis'
Thomas Roediger-Schluga
2001-003 Tragedy of the Public Knowledge 'Commons'? Global Science, Intellectual
Property and the Digital Technology Boomerang
Paul A. David
2001-004 Digital Technologies, Research Collaborations and the Extension of Protection
for Intellectual Property in Science: Will Building 'Good Fences' Really Make
'Good Neighbors'?
Paul A. David
2001-005 Expert Systems: Aspects of and Limitations to the Codifiability of Knowledge
Robin Cowan
2001-006 Monopolistic Competition and Search Unemployment: A Pissarides-Dixit-
Stiglitz model
Thomas Ziesemer
2001-007 Random walks and non-linear paths in macroeconomic time series: Some
evidence and implications
Franco Bevilacqua and Adriaan van Zon
2001-008 Waves and Cycles: Explorations in the Pure Theory of Price for Fine Art
Robin Cowan
2001-009 Is the World Flat or Round? Mapping Changes in the Taste for Art
Peter Swann
2001-010 The Eclectic Paradigm in the Global Economy
John Cantwell and Rajneesh Narula
2001-011 R&D Collaboration by 'Stand-alone' SMEs: opportunities and limitations in the
ICT sector
Rajneesh Narula
2001-012 R&D Collaboration by SMEs: new opportunities and limitations in the face of
globalisation
Rajneesh Narula
2001-013 Mind the Gap - Building Profitable Community Based Businesses on the
Internet
Bernhard L. Krieger and Philipp S. Müller
2001-014 The Technological Bias in the Establishment of a Technological Regime: the
adoption and enforcement of early information processing technologies in US
manufacturing, 1870-1930
Andreas Reinstaller and Werner Hölzl
2001-015 Retrieval of Service Descriptions using Structured Service Models
Rudolf Müller and Stefan Müller2001-016 Auctions - the Big Winner Among Trading Mechanisms for the Internet
Economy
Rudolf Müller
2001-017 Design and Evaluation of an Economic Experiment via the Internet
Vital Anderhub, Rudolf Müller and Carsten Schmidt
2001-018 What happens when agent T gets a computer?
Lex Borghans and Bas ter Weel
2001-019 Manager to go? Peformance dips reconsidered with evidence from Dutch
football
Allard Bruinshoofd and Bas ter Weel
Papers can be purchased at a cost of NLG 15,- or US$ 9,- per report at the following address:
MERIT – P.O. Box 616 – 6200 MD Maastricht – The Netherlands – Fax : +31-43-3884905
(* Surcharge of NLG 15,- or US$ 9,- for banking costs will be added for order from abroad)
Subscription: the yearly rate for MERIT-Infonomics Research Memoranda is NLG 300 or
US$ 170, or papers can be downloaded from the internet:
http://meritbbs.unimaas.nl
http://www.infonomics.nl
email: secr-merit@merit.unimaas.nl